Under 1977.4, a "person" includes individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, business trusts, legal representatives, or any group of persons and therefore any of those entities can be prohibited from discriminating. This means actions by employers and by other entities (for example, labor organizations or employment agencies) can fall under the prohibition in 1977.4 and the broader part 1977.
Yes; under 1977.4, an organization that represents employees (such as a union) can be charged with discrimination under Section 11(c) if it takes actions that discriminate because an employee exercised rights under the OSH Act. The regulation explains that Section 11(c) covers actions by any "person," which includes organizations representing employees, as stated in 1977.4 and the broader part 1977.
Yes; under 1977.4, employment agencies can be held liable for discrimination under Section 11(c) because the term "person" covers any entity in a position to discriminate, including employment agencies. The regulation explicitly notes that entities such as employment agencies may be chargeable with discriminatory action in 1977.4.
Yes; under 1977.4, Section 11(c) is not limited to an employer discriminating against its own employees—one person can be chargeable with discriminatory actions against an employee of another person. The regulation makes clear that Section 11(c) extends to actions by any person as defined in 1977.4 and the broader part 1977.
Under 1977.4, it is prohibited to discharge or in any manner discriminate against an employee because the employee exercised rights under the OSH Act. The regulation summarizes Section 11(c)'s prohibition that “no person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee” for exercising protected rights as explained in 1977.4 and the overall part 1977.
Under 1977.4, the definition of "person" in the Act is broad and can encompass multiple types of entities, which may include governmental or non-governmental bodies as they fall into "one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, business trusts, legal representatives, or any group of persons." The regulation points to the statutory definition in 1977.4 and the overall part 1977.
Yes; under 1977.4, a contractor can be liable under Section 11(c) for discriminating against a subcontractor's worker because Section 11(c) extends to any person who discriminates against an employee for exercising OSH Act rights. The regulation explains that discriminatory actions by any person—not just the direct employer—can be chargeable, as described in 1977.4 and 1977.
Under 1977.4, claims are not limited to firing; Section 11(c) prohibits discharging or "in any manner" discriminating against an employee, so other adverse actions (for example, demotion, reassignment, harassment, or other negative employment actions) can violate the prohibition. The regulation's language and explanation in 1977.4 and 1977 support this broader scope.
Yes; under 1977.4, third-party consultants or safety inspectors who are in a position to take discriminatory actions against an employee could be chargeable under Section 11(c), because the statutory term "person" covers any group or entity that can discriminate. The regulation clarifies this broad coverage in 1977.4 and 1977.
Yes; under 1977.4, employees who report hazards to OSHA are protected from retaliation by non-employers if those non-employers take discriminatory action because the employee exercised rights under the Act, since Section 11(c) covers any "person" who discriminates. See the explanation in 1977.4 and 1977.
Yes; under 1977.4, informal groups or volunteer committees are included in the broad statutory definition of "person" and could be subject to Section 11(c) prohibitions if they discriminate against an employee for exercising OSH Act rights. The regulation explains this inclusive definition in 1977.4 and 1977.
Yes; under 1977.4, Section 11(c) protections can extend to staffing agency employees placed at a host employer because any person who discriminates can be chargeable—this includes actions taken by either the staffing agency or the host employer if the discrimination is due to the employee exercising OSH Act rights. See 1977.4 and the broader part 1977.
No; under 1977.4, the discriminating person does not need to be the direct employer of the worker—the statute's definition of "person" means others (such as contractors, unions, or agencies) who take discriminatory actions can be liable. The regulation explains this point in 1977.4 and in the overall part 1977.
No; under 1977.4 and the July 11, 1983 Letter of Interpretation, leaving the workplace to file an OSHA complaint is not protected activity when an employee departs the workplace because protection for work refusals is limited to stringent conditions in 1977.12(b)(2) (as discussed in the interpretation), and the Letter of Interpretation states that leaving the workplace and being absent the remainder of the shift takes the employee out of the realm of protected activity: see the 1983 interpretation at https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/standardinterpretations/1983-07-11-1.
Under 1977.4 and the 1983 Letter of Interpretation, a work refusal is protected only when the very specific conditions listed in 1977.12(b)(2) are met; the 1983 Letter of Interpretation explains that normally a refusal is not protected and that protection requires all conditions in that subsection to be satisfied, as described in the interpretation at https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/standardinterpretations/1983-07-11-1.
Yes; under 1977.4 and the 1983 Letter of Interpretation, an employee who remained at work, reported a life-threatening hazard to the employer, and then refused to perform the hazardous task would likely have a protected refusal if the conditions of 1977.12(b)(2) were otherwise met, as the 1983 Letter of Interpretation indicates such a scenario would in all probability be protected; see the interpretation at https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/standardinterpretations/1983-07-11-1.
Under 1977.4, the cited cases Meek v. United States and Bowe v. Judson C. Burns illustrate judicial support for treating many types of entities as "persons" who can be chargeable with discriminatory action, reinforcing that Section 11(c) protections are not limited to traditional employer-employee relationships; this statutory interpretation is summarized in 1977.4 and the broader part 1977.
Under 1977.4, a worker who experiences retaliation from a non-employer should understand that such retaliation may be actionable because Section 11(c) covers any person who discriminates; the worker should promptly document the adverse action and may file a Section 11(c) complaint with OSHA. The regulation and the broader part are available at 1977.4 and 1977.